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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
David McPeak appeals from his judgment of conviction for burglary, possession 
of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), and possession of a controlled 
substance (marijuana). He asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to 
suppress because the traffic stop was made without reasonable, articulable suspicion, 
and that the district court abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences on his 
felony convictions. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The following facts are taken from the hearing on Mr. McPeak's motion to 
suppress. At approximately 11 :50 p.m. on August 29, 2012, Officer Joshua Bridges 
received a report of an assault on Brookside Street, "which was in the general direction" 
he was heading. (Tr., p.16, Ls.19-24.) It was reported that a "male came into a house 
and left in a white Ford pickup truck. That was the only information I had at the time." 
(Tr., p.17, Ls.15-18.) He clarified that the male was identified as David McPeak. 
(Tr., p.17, Ls.21-22.) 
Officer Bridges saw a white Ford pickup truck "at the intersection of Linden and 
Ohio which is just to the west of the intersection of Linden and Indiana. It was heading 
towards me." (Tr., p.18, Ls.14-17.) He tried to read the license plate to see "who it 
came back to." (Tr., p.18, Ls.20-21.) Officer Bridges pulled in behind the vehicle, which 
"slowed down to a pace of about 15 miles an hour and then made an abrupt right-hand 
turn onto Maple, then it slowed to five miles an hour and then just stopped on the side of 
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the road." (Tr., p.19, Ls.1-5.) After the vehicle stopped on Maple, Officer Bridges 
placed his spotlight on it, and saw that the occupants were "shifting around a bit." 
(Tr.,p.19, Ls.11-15.) He then activated his lights to initiate "a high risk traffic stop." 
(Tr., p.19, Ls.11-15.) 
Officer Bridges acknowledged that he was looking for a truck being driven by one 
person when it fact there were three people in the white Ford. (Tr., p.21, L.24 - p.22, 
L.2.) He also testified that he was taking a "highly educated guess" as to whether this 
was the truck that had been involved on the incident at Brookside. (Tr., p.22, Ls.2-7.) 
He also acknowledged that there were potentially "hundreds, maybe thousands" of 
white trucks registered in Idaho. (Tr., p.21, Ls:17-20.) 
\/\/hen Officer Bridges approached the vehicle, he found several knives and 
detected the smell of burnt marijuana. (Tr., p.23, L.7 - p.25, L.11.) He eventually found 
a bag that contained a white crystal substance that field-tested positive for 
methamphetamine. (Tr., p.28, Ls.7-11.) 
Mr. McPeak was charged with burglary and aggravated assault for the alleged 
incident on Brookside Street as well as possession of methamphetamine and 
possession of marijuana based on the search of his vehicle. (R., p.20.) He filed a 
motion to suppress, asserting that the stop and the search of his vehicle were illegal. 
(R., p.33.) He sought suppression of all of the evidence relating to the traffic stop. 
(R, p.38.) The district court made the following findings with respect to the motion to 
suppress: 
So it seems like this breaks down into a couple of different things. One is 
the defense motion is based on an improper stop. But as the court heard 
the testimony and evidence in this case, the officer actually didn't initiate a 
stop. The defendant himself stopped, and the officer stopped behind him. 
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At that point when the spotlight goes on, I suppose at that point there's a 
detention. And then of course when the overhead lights go it it seems 
clear that he's being detained at that time. So he's detained with the 
following probable cause evidence that the officer has at the time, and that 
is he's had reported to him that there was an assault at a location, 
although not a block away it's within the vicinity, that the vehicle leaving 
the scene was a white Ford F-150 vehicle which he stopped behind. 
There were unusual behavior [sic] going on with this Ford pickup, that is it 
slowed to 15 miles an hour in a 35 miles an hour zone, turned the corner 
and slowed to five miles an hour and actually stopped, and then there was 
all sorts of movement inside the pickup which is all indicative of maybe 
there's criminal activity afoot. 
He's detained them for 30 seconds to a minute until the other officers 
arrive. They're asked to exit the vehicle. And, indeed, the defendant is 
identified as David McPeak, who apparently the person assault indentified 
specifically as being David McPeak. 
So now at this point in the time officer does have evidence to support 
detention and also sees in plain sight three knives in the vehicle, which 
again he was informed that there was a knife used in this assault, so 
seizing those knives would be consistent with his ability to search the 
vehicle for evidence of this assault that occurred earlier. 
During the course of this search he smells even the faint odor of 
marijuana. I guess when it gets right down to it does the smell of this faint 
odor of marijuana give him the right to search the rest of the vehicle. The 
court believes that the case law cited by the State in this case does 
support that it did allow him at least to search for other contraband, other 
illegal drugs in the vehicle. And, indeed, he did have the ability given the 
probable cause of the assault to search the vehicle further for any other 
weapons that might be evidence of this crime of assault that occurred 
earlier in the evening. 
So the motion, for those reasons, to suppress is denied. 
(Tr., p.52, L.13 - p.54, L.11.) Following a jury trial, Mr. McPeak was found not guilty of 
the aggravated assault but found guilty of the other charges. (R., p.94.)1 The court 
1 Mr. McPeak was also charged, in a separate case, with malicious injury to property 
and possession of drug paraphernalia. These cases were consolidated for trial but 
Mr. McPeak only filed a notice of appeal in the instant case. Thus, he raises no claims 
regarding these other two misdemeanors. 
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imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, for the burglary charge, 
and seven years indeterminate for possession of methamphetamine. (R., p.212.) The 
court imposed 180 days for possession of marijuana. (R., p.200.) The court retained 
jurisdiction for 365 days. (R., p.212.) Mr. McPeak appealed. (R., p.219.) He asserts 
that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress and abused its discretion 
by imposing excessive sentences. 
4 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. McPeak's motion to suppress? 




The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. McPeak's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Mr. McPeak asserts that the traffic stop in this case was not supported by 
reasonable, articulable suspicion and therefore the district court's order denying his 
motion to suppress should be reversed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated." State v. Holland, 
135 Idaho 159, 161 (2000). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, 
the appellate court should "accept the trial court's findings of fact which were supported 
by substantial evidence, but freely review the application of constitutional principles to 
the facts as found." Id. 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. McPeak's Motion To Suppress 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures ... " U.S. Const. amend IV. Article I, §17 of the 
Idaho constitution provides a similar prohibition on unreasonable searches and 
seizures. State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 852 (2000). Therefore, warrantless searches 
and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall into one of the "'few specifically 
established and well delineated exceptions." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 
372 (1993) (quoting Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1984)). The State 
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bears the burden of demonstrating a warrantless search or seizure falls into an 
exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 472 
(Ct. App. 2002). 
This prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to 
investigatory detentions of a person falling short of arrest, as well as formal arrests. 
State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 6502002); State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 346 (Ct. App. 
1991 ). Although an arrest of an individual must be based on probable cause, police 
may seize a person through an investigatory stop without probable cause, provided 
there is a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
30 (1968); Knapp, 120 Idaho at 346-47; State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209 (1984). If the 
officer's suspicions are confirmed or furtt1er aroused, the stop may be prolonged and 
the scope of the investigative stop enlarged. State v. Burgess, 104 Idaho 559 (Ct. App. 
1983). The standard of proof which an officer must satisfy in order to justify an 
investigatory stop is to be judged by the "totality of the circumstances." State v. 
Haworth, 106 Idaho 405 (1984); see United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981); 
State v. Cowen, 104 Idaho 649 (1983); State v. Post, 98 Idaho 834 (1978). The State 
bears the burden of proving that an investigatory stop or detention is based on 
reasonable suspicion and is limited in its scope and duration to the issue being 
investigated. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 500 (1983). 
A seizure occurs when officers detain someone through physical force or show of 
authority. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843 (2004). To determine if someone has 
been detained, the determination to be made is '"whether, under all the circumstances 
surrounding an encounter, a reasonable person would have felt free to leave or 
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otherwise decline the officer's requests and terminate the encounter."' Id. (citing 
State v. Reese, 132 Idaho 652, 654 (1999)). Mr. McPeak agrees with the district court 
that he was seized once Officer Bridges activated his lights. However, he disagrees 
that the stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver of the 
vehicle was engaged in criminal activity. 
"In order to satisfy constitutional standards, an investigative stop must be justified 
by a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police, based upon specific articulable 
facts, that the person to be seized has committed or is about to commit a crime." 
State v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 613, 615 (Ct. App. 1997). Reasonable suspicion may be 
based on a message an officer receives from dispatch, rather than personal 
observations, if the message was based upon facts that themselves give rise to 
reasonable suspicion. Id. The reasonableness of the officer's suspicion is evaluated 
based on the "totality of the circumstances at the time." Id. In other words, the 
"collective knowledge" of all the officers and dispatchers involved. State v. Van Dome, 
139 Idaho 961, 964 (Ct. App. 2004.) 
This case is very similar to State v. Zapata-Reyes, 144 Idaho 703 (Ct. App. 
2007). In Zapata-Reyes, a resident called the police and reported that he was 
concerned that his house may be shot at by three or four people in a "white Corsica, or 
Buick like, a Pontiac." Id. at 705. The Court of Appeals held that the officer that 
subsequently stopped the defendant lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion. The 
court explained: 
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The caller indicated that he thought the occupants of a white passenger 
vehicle, which he observed drive by his house twice, may shoot at his 
house. He also stated that his house had been shot at two weeks 
previously but provided no information connecting the suspicious white 
passenger vehicle to the previous incident. The district court determined, 
from listening to the audio tape of the call to dispatch, that three to four 
minutes passed between when the call came into dispatch and when the 
first officer spotted the white Oldsmobile within a block of the caller's 
residence. The audio tape supports this finding, and we therefore accept 
that the officer first observed the white Oldsmobile three to four minutes 
after the call came into dispatch. However, the caller did not indicate how 
much time had elapsed between when he last observed the suspicious 
white vehicle and when he called dispatch. Additionally, the caller's 
description of the suspicious vehicle was merely that it was a white 
passenger car, maybe a Corsica or a Buick, and did not include a 
license plate number. Although a call reporting a suspicious car with 
uncommon characteristics, such as a purple car or one with unique 
painting decals, may make the car identifiable without a license plate 
number, the caller here described a car of a common color-white-
and provided no other significant distinguishing features. The 
description was therefore not of a vehicle that was easily 
distinguishable from other vehicles. No evidence was presented to 
show whether the Oldsmobile that Zapata-Reyes occupied bore a 
resemblance to any Corsicas or Buicks. Moreover, although not relayed to 
the officers by dispatch, the caller indicated that there were three or four 
occupants in the vehicle that passed by his residence, not two occupants 
as in the Oldsmobile the officer followed and subsequently observed 
Zapata-Reyes exit from. We conclude from the totality of the 
circumstances that the officers did not possess a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion that Zapata-Reyes had committed or was about to 
commit a crime, and the officers therefore violated Zapata-Reyes' Fourth 
Amendment rights by detaining him. 
Id. at 708-09. The vehicle in Zapata-Reyes was described as a white passenger car; in 
this case the description was a "white Ford pickup truck." Just as in Zapata-Reyes, 
Officer Bridges was provided with no significant distinguishing features, and he 
acknowledged that there were probably hundreds of white pickup trucks registered in 
Idaho. 
Further, the vehicle stopped by Officer Bridges carried three people and officer 
Bridges was only given one suspect; the number of passengers did not even match. All 
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Officer Bridges knew was that this was a white pickup truck "in the vicinity." This does 
not constitute reasonable, articulable suspicion - it was, as Officer Bridges 
acknowledged, an educated guess. 
Further, the driving pattern and "fidgeting" of the occupants adds nothing that 
supports reasonable suspicion. As part of its analysis, the district court found it 
significant that Mr. McPeak "slowed to 15 miles an hour in a 35 miles an hour zone, 
turned the corner and slowed to five miles an hour and actually stopped." (Tr., p.52, 
L.13 - p.54, L.11.) How exactly this is suspicious is not entirely clear. Vehicles slow 
down and stop for many reasons - for instance, they could be lost, have reached their 
destination, or need to turn around. 
In State v. Morgan, an officer conducted a traffic stop after observing the 
defendant make four left-hand turns, believing that the driver may be trying to avoid him. 
State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109 (2013). The Idaho Supreme Court held, 
The police officer's suspicion of Morgan was based primarily on a series of 
four left-hand turns that Morgan made. Although the officer stated that he 
believed Morgan may have been trying to avoid him, the officer provided 
no factual justification for that belief. Absent other circumstances, driving 
around the block on a Friday night does not rise to the level of specific, 
articulable facts that justify an investigatory stop. 
Id. at 112. All Mr. McPeak did was slow down and stop. This is not suspicious, and it is 
certainly not indicative of a person seeking to avoid detection; he could clearly be seen 
easier stopped on the road than he could be driving at 35 miles per hour. As in Morgan, 
Officer Bridges provided no factual justification for his belief that slowing down and 
stopping was suspicious. 
Finally, the movement in the vehicle did not give rise to reasonable suspicion. It 
is difficult to determine how fidgeting in a vehicle makes it more likely that the occupants 
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had been involved in an assault. There was no evidence presented that the individuals 
could have been concealing or destroying evidence, and again, the number of people in 
the vehicle was different than the number provided by dispatch; only one suspect was 
identified. 
Therefore, the district court erred by concluding that Officer Bridges had 
reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to initiate a traffic stop. All of the evidence 
seized as a result of the illegal traffic stop must be excluded as fruit of the poisonous 
tree. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-485 (1963); State v. 
Schrecengost, 134 Idaho 547, 549 (Ct. App. 2000). 
11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing Excessive Sentences 
A. Introduction 
Mr. McPeak asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing 
excessive sentences for burglary and possession of methamphetamine. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing Excessive Sentences 
Mr. McPeak asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentences of 
ten years, with three years fixed, for burglary, and seven years indeterminate for 
possession of methamphetamine, are excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. McPeak does not allege that 
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse 
of discretion, Mr. McPeak must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence 
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. ( citing State v. Broadhead, 120 
Idaho 141, 145 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 
(1992))). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection 
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. 
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 
Idaho 138 (2001))). 
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. McPeak explained the events that gave rise to 
the charges in this case. He stated that Kevin Marsh had stolen tools out of his truck 
and so he went to the Marsh residence to look for him. (Sent. Tr., p.39, Ls.1-15.) He 
banged on the door, went in the house, and yelled for Kevin's wife, Angela. (Sent. 
Tr., p.39, Ls.1-15.) He and Angela argued and he told her that Kevin had stolen the 
tools and was on his way home; he asked that she tell him when Kevin returned. (Sent. 
Tr., p.39, Ls.1-15.) He then left without touching her or stealing anything. (Sent. 
Tr., p.39, Ls.1-15.) 
Once Kevin returned home they called the police and Mr. McPeak got pulled 
over. (Sent Tr., p.39, Ls.16-25.) Mr. McPeak stated that Kevin and Angela lied to the 
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police about what happened. (Sent. Tr., p.40, Ls.1-9.) When he got pulled over, both of 
his passengers had drugs and pipes on them and never got charged; he was charged 
simply because drugs were found in the truck. (Sent. Tr., p.40, Ls.10-20.) Since he 
had been in jail, his brother had been released from jail and had taken his truck and 
equipment and got it stolen while out doing drug deals. (Sent. Tr., p.41, Ls.1-9.) 
Mr. McPeak acknowledged that he lost his temper and was sorry. (Sent 
Tr., p.41, Ls.10-13.) He then read a letter that he wrote for Ms. Marsh. (Sent. Tr., p.41, 
L.16 - p.42, L.4.) He apologized for entering her house and acknowledged that he had 
no right to yell at her or bring distress to her home. (Sent Tr., p.41, Ls.16-25.) 
Mr. McPeak stated that his brother, who was in the vehicle with him when he 
got pulled over, was a drug addict and that the drugs found in the truck belonged to his 
brother, yet Mr. McPeak was still convicted. (Sent. Tr., p.43, Ls.14-22.) Mr. McPeak 
stated that he did not drink, smoke or use alcohol. (Sent. Tr., p.43, Ls.22-25.) 
Prior to his arrest, Mr. McPeak was the owner of both Eagle Carpets and Jazz 
Products. (PSI, p.16.) He had been a quality control officer for 15 years at General 
Motors in Flint, Michigan. (PSI, p.16.) Mr. McPeak also earned a journeyman's 
certification in California and was a "union-trained remodel expert." (PSI, p.16.) His job 
skills consisted of baking, building maintenance, flooring, lawn care, plumbing, and 
remodeling homes. (PSI, p.16.) At the sentencing hearing, Mr. McPeak informed the 
court that his wife had told him that "the phone is ringing off the hook with people 
begging me to come to work." (Sent. Tr., p.46, Ls.15-23.) His wife had a place for him 
to stay if he was released. (Sent. Tr., p.46, Ls.15-23.) 
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Mr. McPeak apologized to Ms. Marsh, acknowledged that he lost his temper, 
and acknowledged that he should not have entered her home. Considering that 
Mr. McPeak acknowledged his anger issues and that he should not have disturbed 
Ms. Marsh that evening, as well as the fact that he had been a productive member of 
society and was employable upon his release, Mr. McPeak asserts that the district court 
abused its discretion by imposing excessive sentences for burglary and possession of 
methamphetamine. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. McPeak respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion to suppress and vacate his judgment of conviction. Alternatively, he 
requests that this Court reduce his sentences as it deems appropriate or remand his 
case for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 18th day of February, 2014. 
JUSTIN M. TIS 
Deput/~!-~~ppellate Public Defender 
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